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Abstract: Some recent accounts of constitutive relevance have identified mechanism 
components with entities that are causal intermediaries between the input and 
output of a mechanism. I argue that on such accounts there is no distinctive inter-
level form of mechanistic explanation and that this highlights an absence in the 
literature of a compelling argument that there are such explanations. Nevertheless, 
the entities that these accounts call ‘components’ do play an explanatory role. 
Studying causal intermediaries linking variables X and Y provides knowledge of the 
counterfactual conditions under which X will continue to bring about Y. This 
explanatory role does not depend on whether intermediate variables count as 
components. The question of whether there are distinctively mechanistic 
explanations remains open.  
 
1. Introduction 
In discovering the double-helical structure of DNA, Watson and Crick advanced our 
understanding of how traits are inherited across generations. Yet one hesitates to 
claim that DNA molecules cause heredity. Rather, these molecules are part of the 
process by which traits are passed on. More formally, heredity is constituted by the 
replication and transmission of DNA across generations. The concept of 
constitution plays a key role in recent accounts of mechanistic explanation. Many 
success stories in the life sciences involve showing how the components of a 
mechanism interact to produce a phenomenon, and the relationship between the 
mechanism’s activities and those of its components is a constitutive one. This fact 
alone may seem to justify the view that mechanistic phenomena are explained by the 
organized activity of a mechanism’s components and that the relevant form of 
explanation is different from traditional causal explanations. In what follows, I argue 
that participants in debates over mechanistic explanation have been too quick to 
grant that there are such explanations. Analysis of existing accounts reveals either 
that mechanisms are not distinctively explained by the organized activity of their 
components, or that we still lack an account of this distinctive form of explanation.  
 The locus of my discussion is Craver’s account of the constitutive relevance 
relation, as well as recent interpretations of his account on which this relation is a 
causal one (I focus on Harinen (2014)). I argue that such accounts unintentionally 
render constitutive relevance to be identical to ordinary (within-level) causal 
relevance, and that this result is incompatible with treating constitutive relevance as a 
distinct explanatory relation. Nevertheless, we can make sense of the explanatory 
contribution of the entities that these accounts call ‘components’. On these accounts, 
components are variables that are causally between the input and output of a 
mechanism. I show how, in general, studying a variable that is causally between two 
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other variables X and Y helps one predict whether X would still cause Y under 
counterfactual circumstances. Accordingly, the ‘components’ in these accounts do 
play an explanatory role as intermediaries, but not because they are ‘components’. If 
there is a way that the organized activity of components distinctively contributes to 
explaining a phenomenon, one is hard-pressed to find it in existing accounts.  
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background regarding 
mechanistic explanation and argues that on Harinen’s interpretation of Craver, 
constitutive relevance just is causal relevance. Section 3 presents a more general 
argument for the conclusion that there are no distinctively mechanistic explanations. 
Section 4 presents a non-mechanistic account of the explanatory role of intermediate 
variables. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Mechanisms and Constitutive Relevance  
In “Thinking about Mechanisms,” Machamer, Darden and Craver define 
mechanisms as:  
 
[E]ntities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start 
or set-up to finish or termination conditions. (2000, 3) 
 
An example of a mechanism is a neuron’s firing. When a neuron fires, it increases 
and then decreases in voltage. These voltage changes result from sodium and 
potassium ions moving across the cell membrane, thereby changing the proportions 
of sodium and potassium inside and outside the cell. To explain this process, one 
must identify the properties of the ion-channels – the entities that regulate the 
movement of ions across the membrane – and determine how they perform their 
functions (their “activities”). 
The entities that are organized to bring about the activity of a mechanism are 
its components, and one mechanism can be a component in a larger one. This 
suggests a hierarchical ordering of the world in which a whole mechanism counts as 
one level and its components are at a lower level. The concept of a mechanism level 
is distinct from other level-concepts in the literature such as levels of size 
(macro/micro), levels of abstraction and levels of properties (first-order/second-
order etc.).  
 Craver and Bechtel (2007) argue that the relationship between mechanism 
levels is non-causal on the grounds that causes and effects must be spatially and 
temporally distinct. Since components and mechanisms stand in a part/whole 
relation, they cannot be causally related. The relationship between a mechanism and 
its components is constitutive rather than causal. An account of constitutive relevance 
specifies how an entity must contribute to the activity of a mechanism in order to 
count as a component.  
Craver (2007) provides an account of mechanistic explanations in 
neuroscience. He refers to the mechanism as S and its components as X1, X2…Xn. 
S’s activity is denoted by Ψ (“psi”) and the activities of X’s are denoted by 𝜑1, 𝜑 2…	𝜑 n (“phi-1” etc). A neuron firing is an S that Ψs. A sodium-ion gate opening is an X 
that 𝜑s. In figure 1, the within-level relationship among the 𝜑-ing X’s are causal and 
the inter-level relationship between a 𝜑ing X’s and the Ψ-ing S is constitutive. 
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On Craver’s account, an entity is a component in a mechanism if it is both a 
part of the mechanism and it is possible to change the behavior of the mechanism by 
changing that of the component, and vice versa. More precisely, X is constitutively 
relevant to S if (1) X is a part of S and (2) X’s 𝜑 -ing and S’s Ψ-ing meet the 
following conditions:  
 
(CR1) When φ is set to the value φ1 in an ideal intervention, then ψ takes on the value f(φ1). (155) 
(CR2): if ψ is set to the value ψ1 in an ideal intervention, then φ takes on the value f(ψ1). (159)  
 
f(𝜑  1) and f(Ψ1) refer, of course, to different functions. CR1 and CR2 rely on 
Woodward’s (2003) notion of an ideal intervention. In evaluating the effect of X on 
Y, an ideal intervention determines the value of X in such a way that it no longer 
depends on its direct causes (other than the intervention). Additionally, such 
interventions do not influence Y via variables on causal paths not going through X. 
On Woodward’s account X causes Y if and only if one can change the value of Y via 
an ideal intervention on X. While the concept of an ideal intervention was developed 
for explicating causal relevance, Craver uses this notion to explicate constitutive 
relevance as well. 
 To illustrate Craver’s account, consider his discussion (2002) of how 
scientists discovered the role of the hippocampus in spatial memory. When rats run a 
maze, their hippocampi are activated. Here Ψ is the process of running the maze. 
Intervening to make the rat run the maze causes a change in the activity of the 
hippocampus (a 𝜑-ing X), fulfilling CR2. Yet learning that the hippocampus activates 
when the rat navigates the maze is insufficient for establishing that the hippocampus 
is a component in spatial memory – it is possible that its activity is a side effect of the 
running that plays no role in navigation. To rule out this possibility, one must 
intervene to either stimulate or disable the hippocampus and see if doing so changes 
the rat’s maze-running ability. If so, then CR1 is fulfilled as well. It is through such 
experiments that scientists discovered the role of the hippocampus in spatial 
memory.  
 The subsequent discussion will be centered on Craver’s account and the 
responses it has generated.  I will focus on questions related to mechanistic 
explanation – in particular on whether there is an inter-level form of explanation – 
Figure 1 (from Craver, 2007, p. 7)  
 
Phenomenon 
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and Craver’s book contains the best-developed inter-level account. Yet much of the 
mechanistic literature does not emphasize explanation. Levy (2015) helpfully 
distinguishes explanatory theses about mechanisms from those related to the 
metaphysics of causation and those related to discovery. As an example of the 
former, Glennan (1996) argues that mechanisms are ontologically more basic than 
causes (though he has subsequently revised his view). The literature on mechanistic 
discovery was spearheaded by Bechtel and Richardson (1993/2010) and is alive and 
well in works such as Craver and Darden (2013). This literature focuses on the role 
of mechanisms in strategies for discovery.  Since I am concerned here with 
explanation, I focus on Craver’s account and reference others as needed.  
 In recent years there have been many criticisms of Craver’s account. These 
have become increasingly sophisticated, though the source of the problems they raise 
is simple: talk of interventions on the Ψ variable is ambiguous (Menzies, 2012; 
Franklin-Hall, 2016). Is an intervention on Ψ an intervention that triggers the 
mechanism into action, or an intervention on something that happens at a later stage 
in the activity of the mechanism? These are distinct interventions. Recall that an 
intervention determines the value of the variable that one intervenes upon. But 
ensuring that a rat begins a maze (and observing which components are subsequently 
activated) does not ensure that the rat will complete the maze. Moreover, there is the 
further complication that since the X that 𝜑s is supposed to be a part of the S that 
Ψs, these two variables are not distinct. But the conditions for an ideal intervention 
require that the variable upon which one intervenes be distinct from other variables 
in the model (Harinen, 2014; Baumgartner and Gebharter, 2015; Romero, 2015).  
 Harinen (2014) proposes a way to resolve both problems simultaneously. He 
disambiguates Ψ into two variables, Ψin and Ψout, corresponding to the input and 
output of the mechanism1 (cf. Menzies, 2012). Since these two variables are distinct 
from 𝜑 – the activity of a component that occurs between them – there may be ideal 
interventions on Ψin that change 𝜑 and ideal interventions on 𝜑 that change Ψout. 
These, in fact, are the very interventions corresponding to CR2 and CR1. He 
concludes that – contrary to appearances – constitutive relevance is causal.2  
 Harinen takes himself to be saving Craver’s account, but he in fact trivializes 
it. Although he follows Craver in referring to 𝜑-ing X’s as “lower-level” and Ψ-ing 
S’s as “higher-level”, and draws metaphysical conclusions about the possibility of 
inter-level causation, there is nothing in Harinen’s account that elucidates what it 
means to say that these variables are at different levels. It is true that the account still 
requires that X’s 𝜑-ing be a part of S’s Ψ-ing, but 𝜑 is not a part of Ψin or Ψout. If 
there is no basis for saying that Ψin and Ψout are at different levels from 𝜑, then CR2 
and CR1 identify two within-level causal relationships, one between Ψin and 𝜑 and 
another between 𝜑 and Ψout. To be clear, the problem is not so much that his 
account yields the counterintuitive result that constitutive relevance is causal. Rather, 
it is that the causal relationships that make up the constitutive relevance relationship 
are exactly the same ones as those that exist between a mechanism’s components. 
                                                
1 Harinen might not characterize himself as disambiguating Ψ into Ψin and Ψout, as he considers the 
phenomenon to be the causal relationship between Ψin and Ψout and thus to be distinct from either. 
Nevertheless, I argue below that the variable Ψ plays no role in his account.  
2 See Leuridan (2012) for a distinct argument for this conclusion. 
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 One might object that Harinen does explain how to distinguish between 
levels, since he says that Ψin or Ψout supervene on the activities of particular 
components. Yet the claim that Ψin supervenes on some 𝜑 is not by itself very 
informative. It entails that it is not possible for there to be differences in Ψin without 
there being differences in 𝜑. Although supervenience is often invoked as a feature of 
asymmetric dependence relationships, the relationship is not itself asymmetric. If Ψin 
were type-identical to some 𝜑 such that any change in the value of one were a 
change in the value of the other, then, trivially, Ψin would supervene on 𝜑. So 
supervenience by itself does not help us determine when one entity should be 
characterized as being at one level rather than another. Moreover, any attempt to 
save Craver’s account by explaining how particular components can be described as 
being at either one level or another should itself strike us as strange. While there are 
plausible reasons for distinguishing between the behavior of a component and that 
of the whole mechanism, it is unclear why we would appeal to mechanism-levels to 
distinguish between two ways of describing the same localized components.   
 In the absence of a basis for treating Ψin and Ψout as being at a different level 
from 𝜑 , why should we should treat his account as giving an explication of 
constitutive relevance, rather than showing us that talk of constitutive relevance may 
replaced by talk of causal relevance? I anticipate the response that although Harinen 
requires us refer to Ψin, and Ψout in describing the interventions that are needed to 
discover constitutive relevance relations, the constitutive relationship itself is between 𝜑 and Ψ. But what is ‘Ψ’, then? If it is just the proposition that Ψin causes 𝜑, which 
in turn causes Ψout, what do we gain by treating Ψ as a distinct variable? If not, then 
what further necessary conditions are there for X’s 𝜑 -ing being a component of S’s 
Ψ-ing?3 
My reason for emphasizing Harinen’s interpretation of Craver is not that it is 
especially problematic, but rather that it is especially clear. Any explication of Craver 
needs to deal with the ambiguity in Ψ and the proposed solution provides the most 
straightforward fix. Yet once one does so, it is no longer clear that Craver provides 
an account of constitutive relevance that distinguishes it from within-level causal 
relevance. In the next section, I argue that this reveals a more general problem with 
mechanistic explanation. 
 
3. Constitutive Relevance Without Constitutive Explanation  
It is uncontroversial that there are entities scientists model as components in a 
mechanism, and that these components play various explanatory roles. Minimally, 
components stand in causal relations to other components. But I take it that 
mechanistic accounts of explanation are not merely committed to saying that 
                                                
3 It may seem strange to require Harinen (or Craver) an answer to the question of what ‘Ψ’ is. It is up 
to scientists to pick out phenomena of interest in a domain. Moreover, some mechanists hold a 
‘perspectival’ view on which the decision to give a higher-level characterization of a phenomenon 
depends on scientists’ interest in rendering the world intelligible (Craver, 2013). Here I am asking 
specifically about the variable ‘Ψ’ as it is defined within Harinen’s formal account. The aim of doing 
so is to determine whether the alleged inter-level relationship plays any role in the account. As I argue 
in the following section, an account of explanation positing inter-level relationships should elucidate 
the advantages of modeling inter-level relationships.  This requirement is reasonable whether talk of 
levels is grounded in our interests or in some objective feature of the world.  
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components in mechanisms play various explanatory roles. Presumably, the 
motivation for providing mechanistic explanations is that mechanistic concepts 
matter for explanation, and enable one to present an account that is different from 
accounts not relying on mechanistic concepts. As shorthand for this idea, we can say 
that on such accounts mechanisms “distinctively explain”. In this section I argue that 
mechanists have not shown that mechanisms distinctively explain. In fact, attention 
to existing accounts suggests that they do not.  
 Mechanists tend not to be explicit about whether they are committed to the 
claim that mechanisms distinctively explain. One widespread belief is that 
mechanistic phenomena cannot be explained using laws, but rather require a ‘causal-
mechanical’ explanation (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005, Craver, 2007). It is not 
generally clear if and how ‘causal-mechanical’ explanations differ from causal 
explanations more generally. The idea that law-based accounts should be rejected in 
favor of causal ones is not at all new. If all the mechanists were doing was 
emphasizing the pervasiveness of causal explanations across sciences that describe 
mechanisms, it is unclear what the project would be contributing to the topic of 
explanation, or why mechanistic explanation has received the amount of attention it 
has. Moreover, the broadly held thesis that mechanistic explanations are ‘inter-level’ 
seems important precisely because it helps to distinguish them from within-level 
explanations. In any event, should it turn out that the ‘mechanical’ in ‘causal-
mechanical’ is not doing any conceptual work, this should at least be made clear.  
 Do mechanisms distinctively explain? My argument for skepticism begins 
with the premise that if there is a distinctive form of mechanistic explanation in 
Craver (2007) it is to be found in his account of constitutive relevance. His account 
of within-level causal relevance is just Woodward’s interventionist account. His novel 
contribution on the topic of explanation comes in his treatment of the between-level 
constitutive relevance relationship. Should it turn out that his account of constitutive 
relevance does not contribute to our understanding of explanation, it would not 
suffice for the mechanist to respond that at least Craver defines mechanistic within-
level relevance. We might choose to refer to causal relationships as “mechanistic”, 
but Craver has not provided any distinctive mechanistic account of causation.  
 To be clear, I am not presupposing that mechanists must offer a non-causal 
form of explanation in order for mechanisms to distinctively explain.4 For instance, 
Leuridan (2012) claims that constitutive relevance is itself causal. Nevertheless – and 
this is the key point – he still assumes that constitutive relevance involves a different 
type of explanatory relationship than does within-level causal relevance. It is the 
assumption that constitutive relevance is distinct from within-level forms of 
relevance that I am questioning here, and that I will claim is necessary for inter-level 
explanation.   
 Craver’s focus on inter-level explanation is characteristic of the broader 
literature. While mechanists (e.g. Craver and Darden (2013)) have emphasized the 
multiplicity of mechanism types, some of which might not be best represented in 
terms of levels, there exist few discussions (if any) of the forms of explanation 
relevant to these other mechanism types. Should there be no inter-level explanatory 
                                                
4 While I do not presuppose that constitutive relevance is not causal, I see little basis for thinking it is. 
Existing arguments that constitutive relevance is causal derive this conclusion as a consequence of 
Craver’s account, rather than from reconsidering the metaphysics of between-level causation.  
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relationship, it is unclear what distinctive form of explanation the mechanists have to 
offer. 
In evaluating whether mechanists have in fact presented an inter-level form 
of explanation, I focus exclusively on accounts of constitutive relevance. This 
requires some justification. One might suppose that the question of whether there is 
some inter-level explanatory relationship is independent from that of what counts as 
part of a mechanism. Perhaps simply observing the complex ways that a mechanism 
must be organized to produce a phenomenon itself justifies talk of levels. Yet, there 
are limits to how much one can separate constitutive relevance from the question of 
whether there is an inter-level form of explanation. If there is a form of inter-level 
explanation, then the nature of this explanation should be evident from accounts of 
what it means for two entities to stand to one another in this inter-level relationship.5 
 The claim that the nature of the inter-level relationship should be “evident” 
from an account of constitutive relevance is a bit vague. What matters for my 
argument is the following, more precise, claim: There are trivial ways of defining 
constitutive relevance such that, if the definitions provided were adequate, we would 
conclude that there is no form of inter-level explanation. Imagine a system 
containing three variables X, Y, and Z such that X causes Y and Y causes Z. One 
could stipulate that we should refer to the causal chain X!Y!Z as ‘C’ and then 
describe the relationship between C and a particular variable on the chain such as Y. 
C does not cause Y and Y does not cause C, and Y is a part of C. So the relationship 
between C and Y is clearly distinct from the causal relationships between X, Y, and 
Z. But simply relabeling X!Y!Z as C would not by itself bring into existence a 
new explanatory relationship. Of course, no mechanists are trying to define 
constitutive relevance relationships into existence by mere relabeling. But there is still 
a lesson to be learned from the toy example. Namely, part-whole relationships are 
cheap. The possibility of identifying two variables representing entities standing to 
one another in a part-whole relationship does little to resolve the substantive 
question of whether there is an inter-level form of explanation.  
 Finding explanatory part-whole relationships is straightforward enough. The 
weight of an object is explained by the weight of its parts. But such relations exist 
even in ‘mere aggregates’, which Craver distinguishes from functionally organized 
mechanisms (2007, p. 135). In specifying how a mechanism is explained by the 
organized activities of its parts, the fact that certain properties unrelated to the 
mechanism’s function – e.g. the mechanism’s weight in certain cases – depend in an 
aggregate way on the properties of its components is a distraction. What matters is 
whether the part-whole relationship plays a role in explaining how the components 
come together to produce the mechanistic phenomenon.  
                                                
5 Note that I am not saying that the only way mechanists could justify talk of explanatory levels is 
with an account of constitutive relevance. Rather, I claim that an adequate account of constitutive 
relevance should enable one to see why it matters that two entities stand to one another in an inter-
level relationship. This leaves open the possibility that a general account of how a mechanism’s 
behavior depends on the organized activity of the components could by itself clarify which forms of 
organization should be described in terms of levels. While the literature on mechanistic discovery (e.g. 
Bechtel and Richardson, (1993/2010)) provides examples that could be utilized towards this project, 
the recent literature on mechanistic explanation has focused on constitutive relevance at the expense 
of organization.  
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 To see whether the alleged part-whole relationship matters for explanation, 
we need to make the explanatory relata precise. This is what Craver attempts to do in 
his account of constitutive relevance. But it remains unclear that one can fill in the 
account so that the explanatory relata do stand to one another as part and whole. 
Perhaps once one spells out the relata, it will emerge that mechanistic explanation 
takes place at a single level.  
This is what happens in Harinen’s account. As I have argued, Harinen lacks a 
basis for describing his variables Ψin and Ψout as being at a different level from 𝜑. If 
one were to relabel the variables in his causal chain Ψin!𝜑!Ψout as generic variables 
X!Y!Z nothing of explanatory value would be lost from his account. One might 
insist that Ψin and Ψout should receive special labels because they correspond to the 
input and output of the mechanism that links them. But if all of the explanatory 
relationships in the account are at a single level, we won’t get new explanatory 
relationships by relabeling. Moreover, recall that Harinen draws conclusions from his 
account regarding the possibility of inter-level causation. And certainly one cannot 
derive new metaphysical relationships by relabeling.6  
One cannot evade the criticism that mechanists have not provided an inter-
level form of explanation simply by asserting that mechanistic accounts have a 
different explanandum than standard causal accounts. That is, these accounts seek to 
explain the mechanism as a whole in terms of its parts, rather than to explain an 
event in terms of its cause. But even if the target of mechanistic explanation differs 
from that of causal explanation, this does not show that mechanists have 
distinctively explained the target. If the phenomenon turns out to be a re-description 
of the within-level relationships, we should say they have not. This is true even 
though scientists do not set out to re-describe a mechanism in terms of its 
components and in fact characterize the mechanistic phenomena prior to learning 
about the mechanism’s components. What matters here is not how scientists 
discover the entities responsible for a phenomenon, but whether the proposed inter-
level relationship plays a role in explanation.  
I have claimed that Harinen’s difficulties reflect a more general problem for 
Craver-inspired accounts. One might respond by denying that Harinen offers a 
plausible account of constitutive relevance, since his variables do not represent the 
activities of entities standing to one another in part-whole relationships. In fact, there 
have been attempts to preserve the part-whole relationship between Craver’s 
variables by altering other features of his account. Romero (2015) proposes altering 
Craver’s notion of an intervention. He notes that if X’s 𝜑-ing is genuinely a part of 
S’s Ψ-ing then one cannot ideally intervene on 𝜑 by intervening on Ψ, or vice versa. 
When intervening on X with respect to Y, any influence of the intervention on Y 
must be via X. But if 𝜑 is a part of Ψ, then any intervention on the former is 
                                                
6 The idea that debates about the relationships among mechanism-levels rest on deeper metaphysical 
issues is often supported by a misguided link to Kim’s (1998) causal exclusion argument (Harinen, 
2015; Romero, 2015). Kim argues that second-order properties (such as mental properties, according 
to non-reductive physicalism) cannot have any causal powers over and above the first-order 
properties that realize them. As Craver (2007, 197-8) correctly notes, Kim’s distinction between 
higher- and lower-order properties is orthogonal to that between higher- and lower- mechanism-
levels. Kim grants that wholes have causal properties lacked by their parts (p. 80-87). His higher- and 
lower-order properties are properties of a single entity.  
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necessarily and simultaneously an intervention on the later. And any intervention on 
Ψ is also an intervention on at least one component. Romero proposes that for 
establishing constitutive relevance, the appropriate type of intervention is not an 
ideal intervention, but a “fat-handed” intervention. Fat-handed interventions on X 
with respect to Y influence Y via causal paths not going through X.  
Romero is correct that one cannot (generally) intervene on 𝜑 with respect to 
Ψ (or vice versa). Nevertheless, revising Craver’s account to involve fat-handed 
interventions is not sufficient for clarifying why part-whole relationships matter for 
explanation. The issue is that any intervention on a part with respect to its whole will 
be fat handed, but not all part-whole relationships are constitutive relevance 
relationships. To determine which ones are, Romero still needs the mutual 
manipulability criterion. But to apply this criterion, we need to disambiguate the 
various possible interventions on Ψ, as Harinen does. While I have been critical of 
Harinen’s account, his analysis of constitutive relevance as a three-variable affair 
remains the most straightforward way of accounting for the interventions in the 
inter-level experiments Craver uses to develop his account.  
Attempts to modify interventionism to account for constitutive relevance are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated (e.g. Baumgartner and Gebharter, 2015; Casini, 
2016). What matters for the present argument is that such attempts do nothing to 
reveal why talk of higher-level activities is not just a re-description of lower-level 
activities. In the schematic example above, C and Y are not distinct in the way that is 
typically assumed to be necessary for talk of interventions. While it is interesting to 
think about how to modify interventionism to deal with mereologically related 
variables such as 𝜑 and Ψ (or C and Y), discussions of how to model such variables 
do not reveal that we must do so to account for mechanistic behavior.  
One might suspect that the difficulties I am describing for Craver’s account 
of constitutive relevance ultimately derive from his use of an interventionist causal 
account of within-level relevance. Perhaps such an account cannot capture the 
complexities of mechanistic behavior, and a better account would elucidate how the 
mechanistic whole is more than the sum of its parts.7 While it seems plausible that 
Craver’s account of within-level relevance is inadequate,8 in the context of the 
present discussion rejecting this account is a step backwards. Without an account of 
the relationships among entities at a level, it becomes harder to evaluate whether 
between-level relationships distinctively contribute to explaining mechanistic 
behavior.  
 I now summarize my argument. I began this section with the claim that if the 
mechanistic literature has offered a distinctive form of explanation, it is an inter-level 
form of explanation, which we should be able to find by considering accounts of 
constitutive relevance. I then argued that there are ways of spelling out constitutive 
relevance on which we should deny that there is an inter-level form of explanation 
and that Harinen’s account is an example. So if Harinen’s account is correct, then 
there is no distinctive form of mechanistic explanation. This might incline one to 
                                                
7 See Fagan (2012) for one attempt to develop an account along these lines.  
8 It is difficult to see how the account would adequately model complex dynamical systems such as those 
discussed by Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2013). Additionally Roe and Baumgaertner (2016) raise issues with 
using it to understand complex mechanism-environment interactions. 
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reject his account, but I now want to explore the implications of accepting it and 
abandoning the idea that there is a distinctive form of mechanistic explanation.   
 
 4. Causal Mediation Techniques 
I now explore the possibility that components are causal intermediaries between the 
variables that are treated as the input and output of a mechanism. I am not, of 
course, the first person to suggest this possibility. Menzies (2012) explicitly makes 
this proposal, and if the arguments in section 2 succeed, then Harinen’s account 
reduces to Menzies’. Given that such an account leaves little room for inter-level 
explanation, it is unsurprising that it remains a minority view. But let’s put the issue 
of levels to the side for a moment, and turn to a more pressing question. Would 
identifying components with intermediate variables illuminate why scientists study 
mechanisms? If not, then the proposal is dead on arrival.  
 Fortunately one can give an account of why scientists are interested in 
measuring intermediate variables – or mediators – and of why doing so matters for 
explanation. In this section I will present Judea Pearl’s (2001, 2012) causal mediation 
techniques, which provide conceptual resources for identifying the extent to which a 
cause influences its effect via particular mediators, and draw some implications for 
explanation. In presenting these techniques, I rely on an example that does not look 
like standard mechanistic ones. This is purposeful. One of my aims is to challenge 
the mechanists to say what in their accounts excludes such “non-mechanistic” cases.  
 Causal mediation techniques apply to models in which there are multiple 
causal paths linking two variables. In cases where there is just a single mediator M on 
a single path between two variables X and Y, the relationship between M and the 
effect of X on Y is not especially interesting: M contributes to the effect of X on Y 
insofar as when one ideally intervenes on M, the causal relationship between X and 
Y ceases to obtain. The more interesting cases are those in which there are distinct 
causal paths going through different mediators. In such cases, it is more difficult to 
characterize the distinct contributions of variables along different paths. But causal 
mediation techniques provide conceptual resources for measuring the contributions 
of distinct causal paths between two variables. Pearl’s (2001) treatment of mediation 
differs from earlier attempts (e.g. Baron and Kenny 1986) in that it allows one to 
model systems in which causes do not contribute additively to their effects.  
 Causal mediation techniques rely on the formal framework developed by 
Sprites, Glymour and Scheines (2000) and Pearl (2009). This framework employs 
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to represent the causal relationships among random 
variables. As in Woodward’s account, this framework allows one to explicate causes 
using ideal interventions. In a DAG, an arrow between variables X and Y denotes 
that X is a direct cause of Y. X is a direct cause of Y just in case there is some ideal 
intervention on X that changes the value of Y while all other measured variables are 
held fixed.9 A causal path between X and Y is a set of connected arrows all going in 
the same direction from X to Y. A DAG for a set of measured variables corresponds 
to a set of structural equations in which each variable is represented as a function of its 
                                                
9 Whether X is a direct cause of Y is always relative to a set of variables. X can be a direct cause of Y 
relative to X and Y, but not a direct cause of Y relative to a variable set that includes a variable Z that 
is causally between X and Y. 
 11 
direct causes and an error term. The error term represents all unmeasured causes of a 
variable that are not causes of other variables in the model.   
When a variable Z has two modeled causes X and Y, there is an arrow from 
X to Z and from Y to Z. Since there are two distinct arrows, it is tempting to read 
the graph as saying that the effects of these variables on Z are additive and separable. 
This temptation should be avoided. The value of Z is a function of its direct causes, 
and this function may have any form, including one in which the effect of either 
cause on Z depends on the value of the other. In such a case X and Y interact. The 
distinct arrows do not indicate the independence of the causal contributions of X and Y 
to Z, but rather the possibility of separately intervening on X and Y.  
I now present causal mediation techniques using an example. Imagine that 
scientists develop a drug to reduce cholesterol. The drug has the intended effect, but 
unfortunately it also increases blood pressure. Worse, the scientists suspect that the 
drug is more effective at reducing cholesterol in people with higher blood pressure. 
They consider developing an auxiliary drug to block the effect of the cholesterol 
drug on blood pressure. To determine whether such a drug would be worthwhile to 
develop, they seek to learn more about the contribution of the drug to cholesterol via 
blood pressure.    
 
 
 
 Figure 2 presents two DAGs corresponding to this scenario. These DAGs 
are compatible, though they differ in that figure 2b includes a mediator between 
linking drug to cholesterol. In this DAG, we refer to drug as the ‘treatment’, blood pressure 
as the ‘mediator’, and cholesterol as the ‘outcome’. The path from the treatment to the 
outcome via the mediator is the indirect path, and the other is the direct path. The total 
effect of taking the drug (as opposed to not taking the drug) on cholesterol is the 
effect going through all paths. It corresponds to the difference in (expected) level of 
cholesterol in the cases where one does and does not take the drug. Causal mediation 
techniques identify the contributions of the direct and indirect paths to the total 
effect, though as we will see, the question of what a path ‘contributes’ requires 
disambiguation.  
 When the treatment and the mediator interact in producing the outcome, 
there is a sense in which it is impossible to fully isolate the contribution of each path. 
Given this interaction, the effect of the drug on cholesterol depends on the level of 
blood pressure. This leads to complications for initially promising proposals to 
quantify the influences of the paths. Consider the idea that to evaluate the effect of 
the drug on cholesterol along the direct path, one should perform an ideal 
intervention on blood pressure. This would have the welcome result of disrupting the 
indirect path, thus making it the case that (additionally) changing the value of the 
Figure 2 – in (a), the arrow corresponds to the total effect of the drug on cholesterol. In 
(b), the arrow between drug and cholesterol indicates that drug influences cholesterol through a 
path not going through blood pressure. 
 
Drug 
 
Cholesterol 
(a) 
 
Drug Cholesterol 
Blood 
Pressure 
(b) 
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treatment only influences the outcome via the direct path. But this proposal is 
incomplete, since it does not specify the value to which one should set the mediator. 
Even in the disrupted system, the effect of the treatment on the outcome depends 
on the value to which one sets the mediator. Given interaction, the role of the 
mediator in determining the magnitude of the effect along the direct path cannot be 
eliminated.  
 Even in the presence of interaction, there is a way of understanding the 
contributions of particular paths to a total effect. The first thing to realize is that the 
contributions of paths must be evaluated relative to particular changes in the value of 
the treatment, e.g., the effect of taking the pill as opposed to not taking the pill. In 
thinking about this particular effect, it helps to label the scenario in which one does 
not take the pill as one in which the treatment variable takes on its ‘default’ state. 
Since the mediator and outcome depend on the treatment via the model’s structural 
equations, they will also have ‘default’ values (or distributions) when the treatment is 
assigned its default state. Correspondingly, we can refer to the scenario of taking the 
pill as the non-default scenario, and specify the variables’ non-default values 
analogously. Which value of the treatment gets labeled the ‘default’ is a matter of 
convention, but these labels allow one to easily talk about the complex 
counterfactuals involved in changing the treatment from one value to another.10 
Given this specification of default and non-default values, one can ask: what 
would happen to the outcome were one to change the value of the treatment to its 
non-default value, while still holding the mediator at its default value via an 
intervention? In other words, consider changing the value of the treatment, but only 
allowing this change to be transmitted via the direct path. The effect measured in this 
way is called the natural direct effect (NDE). It is ‘natural’ in the sense that although one 
intervenes on the mediator, one sets it to the value (or distribution) that it would 
naturally have in the absence of the treatment. A schematic representation of the 
relevant interventions is given in figure 3.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The NDE of taking the drug is the effect that taking the drug (vs. not) would 
have on cholesterol, were the individuals who took the drug to have the same blood 
pressure level as they would have had were they to not take the drug. The scientists 
                                                
10 For a more detailed discussion of defaults and path-specific effects, see Weinberger (forthcoming).  
 ? 
Direct Effect 
Figure 3 – White circles indicate the values that each variable takes on when the 
treatment takes on its default value and there are no further interventions. Shaded 
circles indicate the corresponding non-default values. The node with the question 
mark need not take on either the default or non-default value of the outcome. Black 
halos indicate which variables must be intervened upon. The direct effect is derived 
by subtracting the expected value of the outcome on the left from that on the right.  
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in our example should develop an auxiliary blood-pressure-reducing drug only if the 
NDE is non-zero. An NDE of zero would indicate that the drug is only effective 
when it raises blood pressure, so the auxiliary drug would cancel out the effect of the 
original.  
 One could also treat the case of taking the pill as the default, and then 
consider the NDE of not taking the pill as opposed to taking it. One might do so if 
one were considering a population of individuals who had already taken the pill, and 
wanted to know what the effect of stopping the pill would be if doing so did not 
reduce blood pressure. The NDE of not taking the pill is an interestingly different 
quantity than that of taking it. In evaluating the NDE of taking the pill (vs. not) and 
in evaluating the NDE of not taking it (vs. taking it) one intervenes to set the 
mediator to different default values. Specifically, in the latter case, one intervenes to 
set the mediator to the value it would take on if one does take the pill. One 
consequence of this is that the magnitude of the NDE of taking the pill is not 
generally the negative NDE of not taking the pill. These are two distinct quantities 
that are relevant for answering different questions regarding the contribution of the 
direct path.  
What makes it possible to separate the contribution of the treatment to the 
mediator along the direct path is that the variables in the model are linked by 
structural equations indicating the counterfactual responses of variables to changes in 
their direct causes. This is why both the default and non-default values of the 
mediator are well defined. One can further exploit these structural relations in order 
to find the contributions of the indirect path. Our model does not include any 
variable along the direct path that one might intervene upon, but, surprisingly, it is 
not necessary to include one. The trick is to keep the treatment variable at its default 
value, while varying the mediator from its default value to its non-default value 
(figure 4). By varying the value of the mediator, one makes it behave as if it were 
responding to a change in the treatment. By holding the treatment fixed at its default 
value, one ensures that the change in the outcome is not the result of change 
transmitted along the direct path.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The quantity measured in this manner is the indirect effect. Treating not taking 
the pill as the default, the indirect effect of the pill on cholesterol is the difference in 
(expected) cholesterol level between the case where one does not take the pill, but 
has the blood pressure as if she did, and the case where one has the default levels of 
both the treatment and blood pressure.  
 ? 
Indirect Effect 
Figure 4 – White circles: default values. Filled circles: non-default values. Question 
mark: value unknown. Black halos: interventions. The indirect effect is derived by 
subtracting the expected value of the outcome on the left from that on the right. 
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Counterintuitively, the total effect of taking the drug versus not taking it is 
not (in general) the sum of the direct and indirect effects for this change in the 
treatment. This is a consequence of the fact that in systems with interaction, the 
paths need not contribute additively to their effect.11 Although it is common to say 
that in mediation one decomposes the total effect into direct and indirect effects, talk 
of decomposition may falsely suggest that one can divide the total effect into two 
additive components. This is not what mediation does. Informally, the direct and 
indirect effects of taking a pill (versus not taking it) are the amounts by which taking 
the pill would increase the expected value of the outcome, were the effect to be 
transmitted by either the direct or indirect path alone. Typically, the total effect will 
not be the sum of the effects of the paths in isolation. 
Although I have here defined the natural direct effect, in principle any ideal 
intervention on the mediator will disrupt the indirect path and measure a quantity 
that we could refer to as a direct effect (though note that there would be as many 
direct effects as there are values of the mediator). So why focus on the natural direct 
effect? To see this, suppose one were to intervene to set the mediator to some 
arbitrary value other than the ones it takes on when the treatment has its default or 
non-default values. Learning about the behavior of the direct path given this 
intervention on the mediator would not be helpful for understanding the 
contribution of the direct path in the case where one does not intervene on the 
mediator. In contrast, with the natural direct effect, one intervenes on the mediator 
to make it behave as if it were still responsive to the treatment (since which value of 
the mediator counts as the “default” depends on the structural equation linking the 
treatment to the mediator), but it were not responding to the change in the value of 
the treatment.  
The following household example will help clarify the intuition behind using 
the specific quantities defined. Suppose one wants to know whether closing the 
refrigerator door affects the fridge light via the button that gets pressed when one 
closes the door. The relevant test is to open the refrigerator and press the button 
with one’s hand to ascertain that the button’s being pushed causes the light to go off. 
The reason that this is the relevant test for evaluating the effect of the door opening 
on the light via the button is that the pressed state of the button is the state it would 
be in were one to close the refrigerator. If, hypothetically, the button could take on a 
state other than pushed or unpushed, then setting it to that state would not be 
informative about what would happen when the door is opened normally. Although 
this case is one in which there is only a single path, and in which one is measuring 
the indirect effect (which here equals the total effect), it illustrates the motivation for 
defining direct and indirect effects in terms of the counterfactual values that the 
mediator would take on given particular values of the treatment.  
With the concepts of direct and indirect effects defined, we can now turn to 
the question of why measuring mediators matters for explanation. The answer is 
straightforward: they enable one to predict how the effect of the treatment on the 
                                                
11 Pearl (2001) provides mathematical decompositions of the total effect of changing the treatment 
from x to x′into the direct effect of going from x to x′ minus the indirect effect of going from x′ to x, 
and into the indirect effect of going from x to x′ minus the direct effect of going from x′ to x. These 
decompositions follow from the definitions of the given effects and do not correspond to the 
intuitive decomposition of the behavior of the whole into distinct contributions of its parts.   
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outcome would change under counterfactual circumstances. Most obviously, they 
enable one to predict what the effect would be were one of the paths to be 
disrupted. More generally, it is possible to show that the NDE is invariant across 
populations with the same default value of the mediator, but which otherwise differ 
in the structural equation linking the treatment to the mediator (see Weinberger, 
2015; a similar result is available for the indirect effect.) They thereby enable one to 
answer a wider range of “w-questions” of the form: What if things had been 
different? (Woodward, 2003 p. 191). Hitchcock and Woodward (2003) plausibly 
argue the depth of an explanation corresponds to the range of w-questions it is able 
to address.  
The idea that uncovering the components in a mechanism helps one 
determine the conditions under which the mechanism’s activity will be maintained is 
widespread. Glennan writes:   
 
Understanding the nature, structure, and functional organization of the parts that make up 
that mechanism will allow one to determine the range of counterfactual circumstances 
under which the dependency between X and Y would be maintained – roughly those 
circumstances in which the mechanism will not break down. (2012, 288)  
 
As intuitive as this idea is, there has been little systematic inquiry into how studying 
mechanisms aids one in extrapolating the functional causal relationship between X 
and Y across contexts. The one full-length manuscript on the topic (Steel, 2008) 
situates itself in the mechanist literature, although its results appear to be based on 
principles from graphical causal models rather than any specifically mechanistic 
commitments. In any event, we can see that mediation techniques do facilitate 
extrapolation without making any distinctively mechanistic commitments, although 
this point merits a more comprehensive discussion than I can provide here. 
To the extent that components of mechanisms can be characterized as 
mediators, we can straightforwardly see why discovering components matters for 
explanation. The explanatory value of these entities in no way depends on whether 
we refer to them as “components”. There is also no obvious need to talk about 
“levels”. True, the direct and indirect effects are neither causes nor effects of the 
total effect. But this does not show that there is some new form of explanation in 
play. Mediation techniques do not supplement causal explanation with another form 
of explanation. Rather, they show how one can replace one causal explanation with 
more fine-grained causal explanations.  
The cholesterol drug example does not look like standard examples from the 
mechanisms literature. There is no detailed description of the activities by which the 
drug brings about higher blood pressure and lower cholesterol and no physiological 
account of why the drug has its effect. And certainly in some contexts we will want 
these additional pieces of information. What the mechanists have not shown, 
however, is that explanations that do and do not include such information are of a 
different type. For all the talk of the importance of learning about the complex 
physical organization of mechanisms, details about such organization play no explicit 
role in the explanatory account. In fact, when one fills in the details of Craver’s 
account with help from Harinen, the process of discovering “lower-level” 
mechanistic components turns out to be one of providing a more detailed 
explanation of the mechanism’s behavior using causal counterfactuals. This might 
seem like an unwelcome result. Yet I have argued that counterfactual accounts can 
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elucidate the explanatory value of discovering components, while existing 
mechanistic accounts leave this opaque.   
 
 5. Conclusion 
By now there has been an abundance of work on the complications faced by 
Craver’s account of constitutive relevance, and on the question of whether it is 
causal. In general, this literature presupposes that mechanistic concepts matter for 
explanation, even if there are details to be filled in about the relationship between a 
phenomenon and the components underlying it. The modest point made here is that 
once we fill in these details, we need go back and verify that the accounts provided 
reveal there to be a distinctive inter-level form of mechanistic explanation. More 
ambitiously, I argue that when one fills in the details of the dominant account in the 
literature (Craver’s), we reveal there to be no such form of explanation. But perhaps 
we do not need one. Even if we only consider “within-level” explanatory 
relationships, we can account for why studying the components in a mechanism 
enables us to see how a cause brings about its effect and to predict the behavior of 
the mechanism across counterfactual circumstances. If there are explanatory benefits 
to talking about the relationships among mechanism levels, mechanists still need to 
specify what these are.   
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